.

Washington and New Delhi enjoyed what many described as one of the most productive strategic partnerships in the post–Cold War era for over 20 years. But that relationship is now experiencing one of its most trying moments, as the foundations that underpinned it come under strain from a series of factors that continue to erode trust.

“The whole set of things with oil that we’re seeing now, plus the tariff, is a big part of why trust is very, very low in this relationship right now,” Evan Feigenbaum, a South Asia analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said in an interview. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled. The trust is gone.”

Relations have been roiled by a number of factors, including Trump administration tariffs on Indian goods. Trump placed the tariffs in April on a range of Indian imports, citing New Delhi’s failure to cut off its purchases of Russian oil despite Moscow’s war in Ukraine. The tariffs, which applied to Indian items like aluminum, steel, minerals, machinery, and medical devices, were initially set at 25 percent but will double to 50 percent on August 27. Rather than deter India, they appear to have pushed New Delhi into the arms of Russia and China.

Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval visited Moscow last month; Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met there with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov; and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up talks in New Delhi. Modi is also expected to make his first trip to China in over seven years, while Russian President Vladimir Putin is also likely to host the Indian leader in Moscow before the end of the year. For their part, Indian leaders have also been clear in recent days that these developments are not just for show.

“In India, there’s been a hardening of public opinion that this is the United States interfering in their business, so they’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum said.

India’s oil purchases have continued in recent months despite its early hesitations, after Russian crude prices were discounted by six to seven percent. By July, Russian oil accounted for 35 percent of India’s crude oil imports, up from 0.2 percent before the Ukraine conflict. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov said Monday that Moscow “will continue to supply [India] with crude oil, oil products, thermal coal and coking coal,” while there was also “potential for the export of Russian LNG.”

Russia is capitalizing on its gains. “We’re in a phase where the Russians want to pick up market share,” Manturov said Monday. “India will be a high-priority partner in the future. We are not only expanding our exports, but also diversifying them.”

Politics and Performance

The Trump administration tariffs are only one reason for India’s shifting diplomacy. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Washington-based Wilson Center, said in an interview.

In some instances, Indian moves have “theater” value, Feigenbaum said. Kugelman agreed. “There are several dimensions of this relationship that can be woven back together,” he said, “But I would agree that India is very sensitive right now and looking to send signals to the United States, and it is likely to continue in this vein, because Indians feel that their back has been against the wall.”

In other areas, however, Kugelman and Feigenbaum say it is more difficult to see how Modi can back down. “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative,” Feigenbaum said. India’s defense cooperation with Russia had already tapered off before the war, with New Delhi buying more arms from the U.S., France, and Israel. But once Putin ordered his troops into Ukraine, trade with Moscow on energy, at least, skyrocketed, Feigenbaum said.

Kugelman called the purchases “validation” of India’s worldview that “the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

As he steers closer to Moscow, Modi has used his differences with Washington to shore up support at home. He has framed his efforts to bring home Russian oil at a discount as a way to protect the livelihoods of Indian farmers, small businesses, and young workers from a hike in fuel prices, a message that resonates with voters. Kugelman said there had already been enough pain in New Delhi to make it difficult for Modi to go much further. “India has already done so much for the U.S. in terms of tariff reductions, workers’ repatriation, etcetera, etcetera,” he said. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down.”

In Washington, calls for action on India have grown louder. In an op-ed published Monday in the Financial Times, former Trump White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said that India’s oil purchases from Russia are “opportunistic,” “deeply corrosive,” and “demand an immediate response in the form of U.S. tariffs on Indian products that will hit Prime Minister Modi where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”